



I. FEMINISM AND THE TENSIONS OF AUTONOMY
A. Feminist Guidance
Feminism requires a new conception of autonomy. The prevailing con-
ception stands at the core of liberal theory and carries with it the individ-
ualism characteristic of liberalism. Such a conception cannot meet the as-
pirations of feminist theory and is inconsistent with its methodology.' The
basic value of autonomy is, however, central to feminism. Feminist theory
must retain the value, while rejecting its liberal incarnation.
Feminism is not, of course, alone in its rejection of liberal individual-
ism. The individualistic premises of liberal theory (and their inadequa-
cies) have become an important subject of debate in contemporary political
and legal theory.' Feminism offers us a particularly promising avenue for
advancing this debate, not because it provides a fully articulated alterna-
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tive to liberal theory, but because feminist concerns so effectively capture
the problems such an alternative must address.
Feminism appears equivocal in its stance toward liberalism because it
simultaneously demands a respect for women's individual selfhood and re-
jects the language and assumptions of individual rights that have been our
culture's primary means of expressing and enforcing respect for selfhood.
This apparent equivocation is not the result of superficiality or indecision.
On the contrary, it reflects the difficulties inherent in building a theory
(and practice) that adequately reflects both the social and the individual
nature of human beings. Feminist perspectives and demands can guide the
inquiry: they point to dangers, define aspirations, and indicate the con-
tours of an approach that transcends the limitations of liberal theory while
fostering its, underlying values. This article is part of that process: an in-
quiry into the meaning of autonomy, guided by feminist objectives.
B. Self-Determination and Social Construction
The notion of autonomy goes to the heart of liberalism and of the pow-
erful, yet ambivalent, feminist rejection of liberalism. The now familiar
critique by feminists and communitarians is that liberalism takes atomistic
individuals as the basic units of political and legal theory and thus fails to
recognize the inherently social nature of human beings. Part of the cri-
tique is directed at the liberal vision of human beings as self-made and
self-making men (my choice of noun is, of course, deliberate). The critics
rightly insist that, of course, people are not self-made. We come into being
in a social context that is literally constitutive of us. Some of our most
essential characteristics, such as our capacity for language and the concep-
tual framework through which we see the world, are not made by us, but
given to us (or developed in us) through our interactions with others.
The image of humans as self-determining creatures nevertheless re-
mains one of the most powerful dimensions of liberal thought.' For all of
us raised in liberal societies, our deep attachment to freedom takes its
meaning and value from the presupposition of our self-determining, self-
making nature: that is what freedom is for, the exercise of that capacity.
No one among the feminists or communitarians is prepared to abandon
freedom as a value, nor, therefore, can any of us completely abandon the
notion of a human capacity for making one's own life and self.
Indeed, feminists are centrally concerned with freeing women to shape
our own lives, to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the
definition given to us by others (men and male-dominated society, in par-
3. Charles Taylor provides a particularly compelling statement of the importance of this vision in
the origins and enduring power of liberal thought. Taylor, "Justice After Virtue," paper presented at
Legal Theory Workshop Series, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 23 October 1987. See also
"Atomism," supra note 2.
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ticular). Feminists therefore need a language of freedom with which to
express the value underlying this concern. But that language must also be
true to the equally important feminist precept that any good tlieorizing
will start with people in their social contexts. And the notion of social
context must take seriously its constitutive quality; social context cannot
simply mean that individuals will, of course, encounter one another.' It
means, rather, that there are no human beings in the absence of relations
with others. We take our being in part from those relations.
The problem, of course, is how to combine the claim of the constitutive-
ness of social relations with the value of self-determination. 5 The problem
is common to all communitarians but is particularly acute for feminists
because of women's relations to the traditions of theory and of society. It
is worth restating the problem in terms of these complex and ambivalent
relations. Feminists angrily reject the tradition of liberal theory that has
felt so alien, so lacking in language and ability to comprehend our reality,
and that has been so successful in defining what the relevant questions
and appropriate answers are.' Anyone who has listened closely to aca-
demic feminists will have heard this undercurrent of rage at all things
liberal.7 Yet liberalism has been the source of our language of freedom
and self-determination. The values we cherish have come to us embedded
in a theory that denies the reality we know: the centrality of relationships
in constituting the self.
That knowledge has its own ironies: women know this centrality
through experience, but the experience has been an oppressive one. One of
the oldest feminist arguments is that women are not seen and defined as
themselves, but in their relations to others. The argument is posed at the
philosophical level of de Beauvoir's claim that men always experience
women as "Other" (a perverse, impersonal form of "relationship") and in
the mundane, but no less important, form of objections to being defined as
someone's wife or mother. We need a language of self-determination that
4. I once heard a(n otherwise) thoughtful liberal theorist dismiss with exasperation the critique
that liberal theory fails to take seriously the social nature of human beings. "Of course it does," he
said. "Liberal theory is all about the proper rules governing the interaction among people, so, of
course it recognizes their social nature." This observation completely misses the point. Drawing
boundaries around the sphere of individual rights to protect those individuals from the intrusions of
others (individuals or the state) naturally takes for granted the existence and interaction of others.
Such an assumption, however, has nothing in common with the claim that a person's identity is in
large part constituted by her interactions with others. On this view there is, in an important sense, no
"person" to protect within a sphere protected from all others, for there is no pre-existing, unitary self
in isolation from relationships.
5. The parallel with old theological debates about the freedom of man and the omnipotence of
God is really quite striking, Taylor comments on the relevance of these debates to the emergence of
liberalism. "Justice After Virtue," supra note 3.
6. It is, of course, not some disembodied Theory, but those who practice it who arouse these
feelings. The convention is, however, to indulge in the more polite (and safer) sounding reification.
7. Excepting, of course, liberals who think of themselves as feminists. They take their theoretical
framework from liberalism and thus are not part of the enterprise of developing a distinctive feminist
theory.
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avoids the blind literalness of the liberal concept.8 We need concepts that
incorporate our experience of embeddedness in relations, both the inher-
ent, underlying reality of such embeddedness and the oppressiveness of its
current social forms.' I think the best path to this end is to work towards
a reconception of the term "autonomy."
C. Finding One's Own Law
The word "autonomy" is so closely tied to the liberal tradition that it is
often treated as symbolizing the very individualism from which I am try-
ing to reclaim it. Among critics of liberalism one can hear the phrase
"autonomous individuals" uttered with the contempt meant to express the
absurdity of conceiving of individuals in isolation from one another. But
one also hears the word used with approbation, usually in the context of
the problem of achieving true autonomy (as opposed to the false liberal
autonomy). I think the word itself carries with it the complexity of the
issue. The literal meaning of the word is to be "governed by one's own
law." To become autonomous is to come to be able to find and live in
accordance with one's own law.
I speak of "becoming" autonomous because I think it is not a quality
one can simply posit about human beings. We must develop and sustain
the capacity for finding our own law, and the task is to understand what
social forms, relationships, and personal practices foster that capacity. I
use the word "find" to suggest that we do not make or even exactly choose
our own law. The idea of "finding" one's law is true to the belief that
even what is truly one's own law is shaped by the society in which one
lives and the relationships that are a part of one's life. "Finding" also
permits an openness to the idea that one's own law is revealed by spiritual
sources, that our capacity to find a law within us comes from our spiritual
nature.'" From both perspectives, the law is one's own in the deepest
sense, but not made by the individual; the individual develops it, but in
connection with others; it is not chosen, but recognized. "One's own law"
connotes values, limits, order, even commands just as the more conven-
tional use of the term does. But these values and demands come from
within each person rather than being imposed from without. The idea
8. The fact that contemporary liberals know all about "social conditioning" doesn't seem to
change the structure of their concepts. It may mean that they, too, face similar dilemmas but do not
choose to make them central to their theoretical inquiries.
9. In developing such concepts, feminists have an advantage in avoiding one of the pitfalls of
challenges to liberal individualism: women's experience of relationships as oppressive as well as essen-
tial has the virtue of making us less likely to be romantic about the virtues of community as such.
10. Indeed, it may be that the idea of one's own law, as opposed to one's own wishes, presupposes
some transcendent, spiritual order of which we are a part. Such a notion need not, of course, be
anything like Kant's categorical imperative with its exclusive reliance on man's rationality. See Im-
manuel Kant, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, trans. H.J. Paton (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964).
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that there are commands that one recognizes as one's own, requirements
that constrain one's life, but come from the meaning or purpose of that
life, captures the basic connection between law and freedom' 5-which is
perhaps the essence of the concept of autonomy. The necessary social di-
mension of the vision I am sketching comes from the insistence, first, that
the capacity to find one's own law can develop only in the context of
relations with others (both intimate and more broadly social) that nurture
this capacity, and second, that the "content" of one's own law is compre-
hensible only with reference to shared social norms, values, and concepts.
This concept has inherent tensions between the idea of autonomy as
both originating with oneself and being conditioned and shaped by one's
social context. Those tensions are the tensions of feminism, and they come
from feminism's recognition of the nature of human beings. The word
"autonomy" is thus a suitable vehicle for achieving feminist objectives. It
is capable of carrying the full dimensions of feminist values and perspec-
tives. And sticking with the word, working toward reconceiving it, has the
further virtue of rescuing not only a term, but a basic value, from the
confines of liberalism. That is the project of this article.
D. The Objective: Understanding and Overcoming Pathology
So far we have only a general sense of what some of the ingredients of
autonomy must be. I have already mentioned the (problematic) notion of
self-determination. I think comprehension, confidence, dignity, efficacy,
respect, and some degree of peace and security from oppressive power are
probably also components. (Note that these ingredients are both character-
istics of individuals and states of being which presuppose certain condi-
tions in intimate and social-structural relationships.) But we have as yet
no full or integrated articulation of the values and perspectives I have
mentioned. There are many different ways of trying to come to the articu-
lation of a new value or, as in the case of autonomy, to help that value
11. There is a passage in Ursula K. Le Guin's novel, THE BEGINNING PLACE (New York:
Harper & Row, 1980), which expresses this connection: "There was no boundary. It was all his
country. But this time, this was far enough: he would go no further now. Part of the pleasure of being
here was that he could listen for and obey such impulses and commands coming from within him,
undistorted by external pressures and compulsions. In that obedience, for the first time since early
childhood, he sensed the headiness of freedom, the calmness of power" (p. 27).
Of course this connection is played out in the political realm as well, and entails the same paradox:
in a democracy, limited government means self-limiting government. The people must limit them-
selves. The fictions of constitutionalism try to obscure the paradox: a constitution spells out the limits
the people have placed on themselves; those limits once set need not be reconsidered (except in the
exceptional circumstances of amendments). The fiction works particularly nicely in the United States,
where the Constitution was written so long ago. The reality is, of course, that the limits must be
constantly reinterpreted. The "people," in the form of their representatives in the judiciary, must
constantly set and reset the limits that they will treat as clear, fixed, and unquestioned. Within these
self-defined limits, the collective finds its own law, which is an essential element of collective freedom.
I discuss the paradox of self-limiting government more fully in "American Constitutionalism and the
Paradox of Private Property," in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, J. Elster and R. Slagstad,
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 241-273.
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emerge from the process of transforming an old one. Here I want to focus
on a particular dimension of our current conception of autonomy that
stands in the way of the necessary transformation: the dichotomy between
autonomy and the collectivity.
This dichotomy is grounded in the deeply ingrained sense that individ-
ual autonomy is to be achieved by erecting a wall (of rights) between the
individual and those around him. Property (as I will discuss more fully
later) is, not surprisingly, the central symbol for this vision of autonomy,
for it can both literally and figuratively provide the necessary walls. The
most perfectly autonomous man is thus the most perfectly isolated."' The
perverse quality of this implicit ideal is, I trust, obvious. This vision of the
autonomous individual as one securely isolated from his threatening fel-
lows seems to me to be a pathology that has profoundly affected western
societies for several centuries.1"
If we ask ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous, the
answer is not isolation, but relationships-with parents, teachers, friends,
loved ones-that provide the support and guidance necessary for the de-
velopment and experience of autonomy. I think, therefore, that the most
promising model, symbol, or metaphor for autonomy is not property, but
childrearing. There we have encapsulated the emergence of autonomy
through relationship with others. We see that relatedness is not, as our
tradition teaches, the antithesis of autonomy, but a literal precondition of
autonomy, and interdependence a constant component of autonomy. This
model of what actually sustains autonomy is, appropriately, the opposite
of the isolated, distancing symbol of property. We may, in fact, have more
to learn about the nature of autonomy by thinking about childrearing than
by the sort of inquiry into law and bureaucracy that I undertake here.
But there are advantages to avoiding the problems of extrapolating from
intimate relationships to large-scale ones. And some of the relationships
which either foster or undermine autonomy are not of an intimate variety,
but rather are part of the more formal structures of authority (which in-
clude employment relations as well as the officially "public" sphere I deal
12. There is an interesting corroboration of my view of property-based independence as isolation
in J.G.A. Pocock's analyses of the relationship between property and autonomy in 17th century lib-
eral thought: "The point about freehold in this context is that it involves its proprietor as little as
possible in dependence upon or even in relations with other people and so leaves him free for the full
austerity of citizenship in the classical sense" (emphasis added). J.G.A. Pocock, POLITICS, LAN-
GUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (New York: Atheneum, 1971),
91.
13. For a brilliant discussion of the western conception of the separate self, see Catherine Keller,
FROM A BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986). She also
points to another connection between feminism and the reconception of autonomy: men's fear of
women is tied to their fear of the collective. She begins her book (p. 1) with a telling quotation from
C.S. Lewis's SURPRISED BY JOY: "You may add that in the hive and the anthill we see fully realized
the two things that some of us most dread for our own species-the dominance of the female and the
dominance of the collective."
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with here). Ultimately, I think the different approaches (and I plan even-
tually to pursue both) will complement each other.
Here I will focus on how the pathological conception of autonomy as
boundaries against others has played itself out in some of the central pub-
lic institutions of the United States. This approach has the virtue of ad-
dressing immediate problems while at the same time moving toward a
fuller conception of autonomy. The approach is also suggested by my be-
lief that abstract theorizing alone is not likely to get us where we want to
go. If we want to understand the social forms that foster autonomy, we
need first to look at actual practices of collective organization that can
reveal for us the possibilities of a new understanding of autonomy and
help us understand the nature and sources of the limitations of the pre-
vailing conception. Let me turn therefore to the particular problems of
autonomy in the American bureaucratic state.
II. BUREAUCRACY, COLLECTIVITY, AND AUTONOMY
The American bureaucratic state threatens individual autonomy be-
cause it threatens to transform the objects of its action from citizens to
subjects-dependent, passive, helpless before the power of the collective.
This threat is not peculiar to American forms of bureaucracy. Whenever a
democratic society assumes collective responsibility for individual welfare,
it faces the task of implementing this responsibility in ways that foster
rather than undermine citizens' sense of their own competence, control,
and integrity. The traditional American conception of autonomy impedes
this task and thus limits our understanding of the problem and the poten-
tial for its solution. The tradition of American political thought sets indi-
vidual autonomy in opposition to collective power.14 This opposition now
distorts our perceptions. The characteristic problem of autonomy in the
modern state is not, as our tradition has taught us, to shield individuals
from the collective, to set up legal barriers around the individual which
the state cannot cross, but to ensure the autonomy of individuals when
they are within the legitimate sphere of collective power. The task is to
render autonomy compatible with the interdependence which collective
power (properly used) expresses.
The problem of interdependence, individual autonomy, and collective
power takes its characteristic modern form in the relations between citi-
zens and administrative bodies.' 5 The dependence of citizens on those who
14. This focus on American political thought provides specificity in looking at how the problem of
autonomy fits within a larger framework of political theory. The American treatment of autonomy is
particularly focused on boundaries (as we shall see later), but it is not unique. On the contrary, I
think it helps us understand a problem characteristic of all liberal thought.
15. In the course of my discussion I will use both the terms "state power" and "collective power."
I am addressing the broad problem of the tension between individual autonomy and the power of the
collective. In our political system that power is ordinarily exercised by the state, and thus in most
contexts it is appropriate to refer to state or governmental power; but part of my argument is that the
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apply policy to their particular cases poses a problem distinct from the
traditional issues of democracy. The extent to which the policies adminis-
tered are formulated by bodies (e.g., elected legislatures) which citizens
have democratic access to and control over continues to be an important
issue. But it is no longer the only one.
Even if legislative policy-making were democratically optimal, citizens
in the modern state would still be subject to the decisions of administra-
tors. People's knowledge that the policies behind these decisions were
made in some distant way with their consent may do little to ease their
sense of dependence and helplessness. (The distant quality of consent
seems likely to prevail in any large-scale society, even when the forms of
democracy make citizen participation active, widespread, and effective.)
The nature of people's interactions with bureaucratic decision-making
may be as important as the nature of legislative policy-making16 in deter-
mining whether citizens are autonomous members of a democratic society
or dependent subjects of collective control.
The objective of making the direct exercise of collective power condu-
cive to the autonomy of those subject to it requires more than a shift in
focus from legislation to administration. We also need to see that our
traditional focus on protecting the individual from the collective has given
us a distorted image of the problem of autonomy and of alternative visions
of society. The prevailing conception of autonomy sets alternatives in the
context of a false choice: when autonomy is identified with individual in-
dependence and security from collective power, the choice is posed be-
tween admitting collective control and preserving autonomy in any given
realm of life. It is as though the degree of collective responsibility for, say,
the material needs of citizens must result in a corresponding decrease in
the autonomy of those receiving the benefits. Such a dichotomy between
autonomy and collective power forecloses a whole range of social arrange-
ments-at least to anyone who values autonomy. A classic example of a
choice premised on this dichotomy is the claim that a free press is possible
only if newspapers are privately owned. This claim rests on a notion of
what the law can and cannot do which is unfounded. It assumes, first,
that the law can protect property against the power of the collective and
that this protection will provide the necessary insulation and foundation
for freedom of expression. At the same time, the claim assumes that the
tension will endure however collective power is organized. The analysis therefore should be relevant
both to alternative political systems and to the non-governmental power exercised by such "private"
entities as corporations.
16. The legislative and bureaucratic "models" of democratic citizenship are in some ways in ten-
sion with one another. If the legislature managed to make all policy decisions, if it were possible to
formulate rules which neutral, efficient bureaucrats could apply mechanically (i.e., without evil de-
grees of discretion), citizens would be spared the sense of being subject to arbitrary control. But they
would also have little scope for participation in the decisions on their own cases. While this may be
advantageous from one point of view, it may seriously undermine the autonomy of citizens directly
subject to governmental action over which they feel they have no control.
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law cannot provide comparable direct protection of this freedom by legal
limits on the power of the state to control expression. The implicit conclu-
sion is that if there were public rather than private ownership of the
press, those wishing to express their views would require the (virtually
uncontrollable) "permission" of the state.
This conclusion denies the possibility of structuring the relations be-
tween citizen and public press, their corresponding rights and powers, in a
way compatible with freedom of expression. But we need no more assume
that the relationship would take the form of "asking permission" to use
the press than we assume the necessity of asking permission to use public
schools, parks, or water. There is nothing in the nature of the legal pro-
tections themselves (as I shall return to later) nor in our experience of
public resources to justify the stark dichotomy between freedom founded
on private property and tyranny produced by collective control.17
State control of resources always poses problems, but the American le-
gal system has found ways of distinguishing control from caprice, of ren-
dering dependence upon state services (imperfectly) compatible with free-
dom and autonomy. Were the dichotomy between state power and
autonomy exhaustive and inevitable, we would be forced either to give up
on autonomy in large spheres of our lives or to advocate a vast limitation
on state power, which would be incompatible both with modern economic
and political realities and with aspirations for a more communal and eq-
uitable society. This choice is not necessary. Despair about individual
freedom in the face of collective power reflects a poverty of imagination
about the possibilities for protection and control.
Belief in the false choice between autonomy and collective power is the
product of a powerful tradition of political thought. Paradoxically, the
tradition (mis)shapes the perception of the problem while pointing in the
direction of solutions. Our legal tradition itself suggests the possibilities of
protection and control. To see both the problem and the possibilities more
clearly, we need first to examine the tradition.
III. AUTONOMY AND PROPERTY IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION1 8
A. Boundaries and Dichotomies
Our political tradition has virtually identified freedom and autonomy
with the private sphere, and posed them in opposition to the public sphere
of state power. The idea of a boundary between these spheres, a line di-
17. The example of airwaves, of course, points to the complexity of governmental control. The
government has assumed a much larger role in regulating the electronic than the written media, on
the grounds of regulating a finite public resource. One need not be sanguine about the history of this
regulation to see that public control can take a wide range of forms.
18. The arguments in this section are spelled out more fully in Jennifer Nedelsky, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A VIEW FROM THE FORMATION,
forthcoming from University of Chicago Press.
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viding individual autonomy from the legitimate scope of state power, has
been central to the American conceptions of freedom and limited govern-
ment. The notion of a boundary took shape in the early development of
our Constitution, and it was property which was the focal point for this
idea. While parts of this story are well known, they bear a retelling (and
reformulation) here as the framework for the prevailing conception of
autonomy.
The revolutionary slogan "no taxation without representation" posed
consent as the basis for legitimacy. It asserted not that private property
could never be taken by the state, but that such taking was legitimate only
if consented to by the governed. This idea also took the form of claims
that a government which could take property without consent was tyran-
nous and reduced men to slaves. These claims reflected the sense that the
major threat to freedom and autonomy was the inability to have some say
in the decisions which affected important aspects of one's life. But this
emphasis on consent shifted with the grim realization that consent alone
was no guarantee against injustice or tyranny.19
In the 1780s duly elected state legislatures passed a variety of debtor
relief laws which were widely viewed as violations of property rights and
as evidence of the intrinsic vulnerability of property (and, more generally,
minority) rights under popular government. The concern turned to mak-
ing popular government compatible with the security of individual rights
and to asserting as a matter of political principle that consent was not a
sufficient basis for legitimacy. "Rules of justice"2 and the concept of basic
rights formed independent standards against which to measure the legiti-
macy of democratic outcomes. The need to inculcate these independent
standards, and the particular preoccupation with protecting property
against tyranny by the majority, led to a differentiation between civil and
political rights and a clear hierarchical relation between them. Political
rights were merely means to the true end of government: the security of
private or civil rights. This security itself, as well as the principle of con-
sent, required some form of representative government. But for the Feder-
alists-whose views triumphed in the writing of the Constitution and in
the dominant tradition of American political thought-the focus of con-
cern was not on designing means for men to have an active share in their
own governance, but rather designing means to contain, control, and mini-
mize the threat of popular political power. There is virtually nothing in
Federalist thought which treats political participation as an important
component of individual autonomy, as a dimension of self-determination
with intrinsic value.21
19. See Gordon Wood, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1969).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
21. The Anti-Federalists did treat political participation in this way. See Nedelsky, Confining
[Vol. 1: 7
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The Federalists drew on a tradition (Locke, for example) which em-
phasized rights as the object of legitimate government and hence the limit
to it. But in the context of the American fear of popular tyranny, the
conception of rights as limiting values hardened into opposed categories of
state vs. individual and public vs. private. Individual autonomy was con-
ceived of as protected by a bounded sphere-defined primarily by prop-
erty-into which the state could not enter. The sphere of rights, freedom,
autonomy was private. And the means of assuring those rights, that au-
tonomy, was to keep the public realm distant, separate, at bay. The peo-
ple (in a highly mediated, carefully structured system of government)
would control the public realm: collective decisions wohuld be taken on
democratic principles. But every effort was made to minimize the chances
of those decisions encroaching on the private realm. The idea of a bound-
ary to the legitimate scope of the public realm then crystallized in judicial
review. And, as in the earlier conception of divided spheres, property was
the central issue around which the idea of judicially enforceable bounda-
ries developed.
There was, finally, another dimension to the parallel divisions between
state and individual, public and private: the opposition between politics
and market. This dichotomy was part of the conceptual framework which
placed freedom and autonomy on the side of the "individual," "private,"
and "market" and coercion on the side of the "state," "public," and
"politics." The coercive power of the collective was given free expression
in legislation. The rights of individuals (private rights), by contrast, were
given order, protection and scope through the common law, which permit-
ted market transactions-ostensibly without the coercive intervention of
the state, without the purposive, collective decision-making of the legisla-
ture.22 Free, private, individual (trans)actions stood in defensive opposi-
tion to coercive control by collective (public, legislative) power.
We now have a picture of a legal and political ideology which identified
autonomy with a private sphere defined and bounded by property. This
was the conceptual framework which prevailed (despite major deviations
from it in practice) until 1937,2" and which continues to haunt and shape
both theory and practice.
Three things need to be said about this picture of law, state, and auton-
omy. The first (which in its full dimensions is beyond the scope of this
paper) is that the dichotomous categories of liberal theory have always
been illusory. Second (and only apparently in contrast), these categories
Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution (Book Review), 96 HARV. L.
REV. 340 (1982).
22. Friedrich A. Hayek offers a particularly clear statement of (and argument for) these contrasts
in our tradition in his LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, Vol. 1, Chs. 5 and 6 (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1973).
23. This was the date of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which is the conven-
tionally recognized turning point in a long process.
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and constellations of beliefs, and their related concepts of the rule of law
and the sanctity of property, could not have had such power and endur-
ance if they were based on illusion only. If I am right that their meaning
was not what it purported to be, then our task is to discover the truths
which lay behind them. Third, whatever the subtle truths behind the tra-
dition, its basic components of property and boundary are no longer ade-
quate to the contemporary problems of autonomy. I shall begin with the
illusions, turn to the particular inadequacy of property, and then note the
insights this misleading tradition nevertheless provides.
B. Illusions
The dichotomies of state-individual, public-private, politics-market,
legislation-common law were always illusory. The central part of the illu-
sion was the association of freedom with the second term of each dichot-
omy and coercion with the first. It is not simply that things have changed
so much that the categories no longer make sense. Rather, the dichotomies
from the beginning served to mask the role of state power in the second
set of terms.24
To take a central example, property rights are defined by the legal sys-
tem. The security they provide rests on the power of the state to punish
those who trespass on those rights. And the power and independence
which individuals derive from property rests on the rules the legal system
has set up to define what constitutes legitimate and enforceable transac-
tions, what goods can be demanded on the basis of what sorts of claims.
Property takes its power and importance in large part from "the mar-
ket"-which is itself defined by the legal system. "The market" is not a
freestanding, natural phenomenon, but consists of rules defined by law
and backed by the power of the state. 5
Only a radical difference between common law and legislation (such as
Friedrich Hayek eloquently, but in the end unpersuasively, defends2 ) can
maintain the claim to the essential privateness and freedom of property
and the market. But the actual workings of the common law have not
24. Theodore Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1979), and Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976), offer graphic illustrations of the inaptness of similar traditional
categories.
25. There can, of course, be markets where there is no legal system like ours. Custom alone may
define both rules and sanctions. Even in our society there are areas of commercial transaction gov-
erned largely not by law, but by agreement among parties with adequate enforcement power of their
own. I leave aside for the moment whether these customary norms constitute a form of collective
power radically different from that exercised through legislation. But, in any case, in our system "the
market" consists essentially of legal rules and is in that sense a creature of the state.
26. Hayek, supra note 22, argues that the common law is neutral, non-purposive, and the articu-
lation of spontaneously arising custom. It is "the law of freedom" because it merely provides the
framework for the exercise of freedom. Legislation, by contrast, is aimed at the achievement of some
collective purpose and must by its nature be coercive.
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been Hayekian. 2 They have not had the essential lack of purposiveness
he claims. The common law has been informed and shaped by particular
conceptions of fairness, freedom, and progress. The "neutral" rules of the
game correspond to a particular vision of the good society which gives
advantages to some players over others in systematic, if not perfectly pre-
dictable ways.
I have embarked on this both overly long and too abbreviated argument
about property, the market, and the common law to show that the long
prevailing conception of autonomy was embedded in a set of categories
and oppositions that were in basic ways illusory. And to the extent that
the contrasts are illusory, the choices they point to are false.
Property is the creature of the state. To replace property as the symbol
and source of autonomy may redefine the relations between citizens and
the state. But the choice to do so (as in the free press example above) is
not a choice between private and free on the one hand and collective and
coercive on the other. Because reality has never corresponded to these neat
oppositional categories, there is no need to choose between them. Freeing
ourselves from misleading categories and false choices opens the possibility
for individual autonomy in the context of collectivity.
C. Contemporary Inadequacies
While the dichotomies of liberal theory have always been illusory, there
is a particular inadequacy to the role played by property today. Private
property was for 150 years the central and defining instance of the bound-
ary between governmental authority and individual autonomy. Property
can, however, no longer serve this function because it has lost its original
political significance.
Property no longer provides people with the basis for independence and
autonomy in the eighteenth-century sense. For the farmer who tilled his
own land or the craftsman who owned his tools, property was a real
source of independence. However much they depended on good weather
or customers, their property gave them a control over their livelihood, and
hence their independence, which was radically different from that of mod-
ern wage earners, salaried professionals, or stockholders. The dependence
of wage earners on their employers is obvious. But even stockholders, who
own their shares, have little control over the source of their income. Their
income, like that of most professionals, embeds them in a network of rela-
tionships characterized by interdependence rather than independence. The
percentage of Americans for whom property provides the traditional inde-
27. Morton J. Horwitz's THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977) provides the clearest evidence of this. Even critics who challenge
many of Horwitz's claims do not present a picture of the common law as having the natural and
undirected quality which is a central part of Hayek's picture.
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pendence of the yeoman farmer is now so small that the idea of property
as the basis for autonomy has lost most of its original meaning.28 In addi-
tion, property itself is now subject to regulation to such an extent that it
cannot serve symbolically or substantively as the boundary between indi-
vidual rights and governmental power.29
Moreover, the very idea of an inviolable sphere can no longer be the
central issue of autonomy in the modern state.30 As more and more issues
are seen in terms of collective rather than individual responsibility, there
will be fewer and fewer spheres of activity in which the state is not in-
volved. As the reality of interdependence shapes the scope of collective
action and control, citizens will increasingly be subject to governmental
authority to license, regulate, and distribute benefits. The model for au-
tonomy must be integration, not isolation. The task is to make the interde-
pendence of citizen and state conducive to, rather than destructive of,
autonomy.
We have some reason to be optimistic about finding the means of doing
so. The old dichotomies prove to be misleading. And, as the final section
of this article will suggest, contemporary administrative law gives glimpses
of what such means might be like. But in reconceiving autonomy, in
reconstituting its sources and protections, we should also try to uncover
the truths which have sustained the traditional framework for so long.
D. Lessons for Reconceiving Autonomy
There are, of course, explanations other than truth for the endurance of
ideology. Those in power usually have considerable resources for fostering
28. The importance of property has never been simple. Even in 1787, many of the Framers de-
rived an important part of their income from complicated transactions in bonds and speculative ven-
tures in joint stock companies. Certainly not all of these men shared Jefferson's vision of an agrarian
republic. But they did see a close connection between wide-spread, small-scale ownership of property
and political independence, and they feared the day when wage labour would sever that connection.
Important dimensions of the connection have now disappeared, leaving behind, perhaps, residual
dreams of home ownership as the last widely available form of autonomy sustained and protected by
property. The receding reality of the property-autonomy nexus is not the same as the advantages and
insulation wealth continues to provide.
29. There is, of course, the related but distinct question of whether some form of property is
essential for autonomy. If property is so broadly defined that it means the concrete expression of
autonomous action, then, practically tautologically, autonomy requires property. Such a definition
leaves entirely open the practices of use, possession, alienation, and advantage that we associate with
property. Margaret Radin has tried to distinguish between those dimensions of conventional property
essential for what she calls personhood and those unsuitable to and even destructive of that value
(which, I think, includes, but is not synonymous with autonomy). See Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). The extent of my claim here is that the current meaning of
property no longer stands in any clear or necessary relation to autonomy.
30. The problem of boundaries does not disappear. Part of the task of ensuring the good society is
to redefine the relation between citizen and state, individual and collective. That task includes identi-
fying those realms which should be considered private, beyond the scope of collective control. My
point is that the definition of such boundaries cannot be the only basis for autonomy in a society




beliefs which sustain the status quo. But it seems likely that when partic-
ular conceptions have endured for centuries in both the popular imagina-
tion and theoretical writings, they can provide insights into the problems
they address. It is not possible here to unpack everything embedded in the
tradition I have outlined. But we can examine some of the directions the
tradition points to, some of the problems it alerts us to in the effort to
reconceive autonomy.
The first is that while the stark opposition between autonomy and col-
lectivity presumed in the American tradition is misleading, that opposition
also reflects a basic truth. There is a real and enduring tension between
the individual and the collective, and any good political system will recog-
nize it. The problem with our tradition is that it not only recognizes, but
highlights the tension, and has a limited view of the non-oppositional as-
pects of the relation and of the social dimension of human beings. There is
thus a twofold objective in reconceiving autonomy: (1) to recognize that
the irreducible tension between the individual and the collective makes
choices or trade-offs necessary; and (2) at the same time, to move beyond a
conception of human beings which sees them exclusively as separate indi-
viduals and focuses on the threat of the community. The collective is not
simply a potential threat to individuals, but is constitutive of them, and
thus is a source of their autonomy as well as a danger to it.31 For some
purposes it makes sense to talk about the separate constructs of "the indi-
vidual" and "the community." But those constructs are misleading 2 if
they obscure the fact that people do not exist in isolation, but in social and
political relations. People develop their predispositions, their interests,
their autonomy-in short, their identity-in large part out of these rela-
tions. The very way one experiences and perceives the world, for example,
is shaped by the social constructions of language. The task, then, is to
think of autonomy in terms of the forms of human interactions in which it
will develop and flourish.3 And the starting point of this inquiry must be
31. The childrearing model is helpful here: parents are both a source of a child's autonomy and a
potential threat to it. It is easy to see that the powerful relationship of dependency children have with
their parents is a necessary foundation for the child's autonomy. But the relationship can also be
structured in ways that undermine autonomy, that maintain dependence. It is probably the case that
all relationships necessary for autonomy can easily be perverted to undermine it.
32. In our current discourse it is hard to avoid such misleading language. The concept of "self-
determination," which I described as central to autonomy, carries the tension implicit in the problem
itself. Few people in our culture believe that people are truly self-determining. It is commonly ac-
cepted that people are shaped to a great extent by their culture and genetic make-up. Yet self-
determination remains an important value and aspiration. The new conception of autonomy must give
force to the aspiration while incorporating a recognition of interdependence.
33. Bruno Bettelheim offers a brief but fascinating discussion of the kinds of relations which foster
autonomy. In his account they are direct and personal rather than large scale, anonymous, or abstract.
If his views are correct, we can both understand something about why autonomy has been associated
with the private sphere and see that the relevant characteristics are possible in spheres not convention-
ally considered private. Bettelheim offers as examples both the relation to parents and to teachers.
Bruno Bettelheim, THE INFORMED HEART: AUTONOMY IN A MASS AGE (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1960), 95-97.
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an attention both to the individuality of human beings and to their essen-
tially social nature. The hope is that a society with such an outlook could
escape some of the problems of our more limited perspective and could
structure relations of community which also fostered autonomy.
The tradition warns us, however, that there is probably an inevitable
trade-off between collective cohesion and responsibility on the one hand,
and individual freedom and autonomy on the other-at least as we cur-
rently understand these concepts. The individualism of liberal capitalism
has never actually provided all citizens with its proclaimed values of free-
dom and independence. But our system has made comparatively few de-
mands on its citizens and has left a wide scope for individual choice.
American democratic capitalism has neither demanded nor fostered excel-
lence, virtue, commitment, social or civic responsibility (which is not, of
course, to say that none of these ever emerged). A society which seeks to
promote these characteristics will have a far greater interest in the values
its members hold, the relationships they form, and the way they choose to
spend their time and their talents. Such a society will almost certainly be
more demanding and constraining in those areas, leaving fewer spheres of
action to private choice.
Ultimately, the objective is to find the optimal relation between individ-
ual and collective and, more particularly, to understand the core of human
autonomy and the forms and scope of collective activity that will foster it.
We can take from the tradition a recognition that the new forms of auton-
omy within collectivity will involve choices, even trade-offs. But the limi-
tations of our current conceptions should lend us confidence that to choose
new forms of autonomy is to reconstitute it, not abandon it.
The tradition also offers us a way of grasping the essence of autonomy.
An understanding of the powerful associations between property, security,
and autonomy is likely to provide a better sense of the nature of autonomy
and the requirements for it. (This despite the fact that autonomy in a
collective state will be quite different from the individualistic, oppositional
model associated with property.)
The rhetorical, even mythical power of the identification of property
with freedom goes beyond the literal power and advantages of property
under liberal capitalism. And the experience of the rights of property as
qualitatively different from and more secure than other legal rights cannot
be accounted for by the legal history of property rights. Property rights
have in fact been subject to a great deal of state interference and to redefi-
nition which amounted to destruction.34 As I argued earlier, there is noth-
ing intrinsic about legal rights of property which make them a more
promising basis for freedom than other legal rights. Property rights, like
34. See M. Horwitz, supra note 27, and Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource
Allocation by Government in the United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973).
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all legal rights, take their formal meaning from definitions and guarantees
provided by the state. The security which property provides rests, on an
institutional level, on the state's power to protect what it defines as prop-
erty. And the forms and means of defining and protecting property are, at
root, indistinguishable from those of other legal rights.
What then accounts for the enduring associations between property and
autonomy? Two striking and distinguishing characteristics of property are
its concreteness and the relative unobtrusiveness of the state power which
lies behind it.3" The concreteness of property makes it an effective symbol.
It is easy for people to see the relationship between owning property and
autonomy, and it seems (deceptively) easy to know what property is and
when it is violated. And most people do not think of their ownership of
property as in any way involving the state; it is simply theirs. It is not
granted to them by the state or administered by the state. Most property
rights can be exercised most of the time without the obvious intervention
of the state. The fact that property rights only have meaning when backed
by the power of the state seems an abstraction that students have a hard
time grasping, many sophisticated theorists ignore entirely, and the gen-
eral population has no idea about. Due process, by comparison with prop-
erty, is abstract rather than concrete and clearly requires official action. If
these are the characteristics which make the association of property with
freedom so compelling, we should be alerted to the probable limitations of
due process as an alternative source, symbol, or protector of autonomy.
Finally, my comments about property reflect a more general approach
to the problem of autonomy and to what tradition and current practices
can teach us about it. Autonomy is an elusive problem in part because it is
practically inseparable from an experience or feeling.3" In an earlier ver-
sion of this article I added the qualification that "It would, of course,
seriously distort any political analysis of autonomy to treat it as a 'mere'
feeling. One can evaluate the degree of autonomy an individual is actually
capable of exercising, and there can be disparities between experience and
reality." This qualification was an effort to meet the objection that people
35. This argument is elaborated in J. Nedelsky, supra note 11.
36. It is important to avoid a misunderstanding about the "mere subjectivity" of feelings. In my
view, feelings have two dimensions not commonly associated with the word: (1) There is a truth about
feelings. One can be right or wrong about them. Thus while they are subjective in the sense that only
the person having the feeling is "authoritative" on whether she feels something, her true feelings are
not simply whatever impression, or experience, or sensation she has at the moment. A person must
inquire internally to determine her true feelings. They may be hard to discern, there may be confu-
sion, but there is in the end a right answer to what she really feels. (2) The related point is that
feelings are, at least in our culture, not always immediately ascertainable. There is a commonplace
association between the word "feeling" and something like the experience of a pin prick. One feels
pain. No inquiry is necessary. The experience is immediate and obvious. The perception is instanta-
neous and (under normal circumstances, excluding states of hypnosis or delusion) infallible. But this
association is misleading. Even a feeling like anger is by no means always obvious. Only the "feeler's"
statements are authoritative, but she can be mistaken. In our culture most people seem to need to
learn to recognize the signs by which one can tell the truth of a feeling.
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may be deluded about what provides them with autonomy." In fact, I
think people may be very wrong in their opinions about the relation be-
tween autonomy and institutions or practices. But I doubt that it makes
sense to say they could actually feel autonomous and not be so." How-
ever, just as we need to develop a new conception of autonomy, probably
most of us need to learn what real autonomy feels like.
Our actual experiences of autonomy-those rare moments when we feel
that we are following an inner direction rather than merely responding to
the pushes and pulls of our environment-are so fleeting that it is often
difficult to know or remember what it is like to live by one's own law.
And our society misleads us about the very nature of autonomy as well as
the conditions for it. We not only learn, as I noted above, that the essence
of autonomy is the power to close out others; we are also taught that
money is power and power is freedom-and the power is from and over
others, not inner power. 9 We are taught that the capacity to manipulate
our environment is the power of freedom. A participant at the Yale Legal
Theory Workshop, where an earlier version of this article was presented,
suggested that those who feel autonomous are those who believe that their
actions generate predicted and desired results, as opposed to those who
feel powerless to control their lives, who feel buffeted about by forces be-
yond their control. (This notion of autonomy, he pointed out, has the vir-
tue of being measurable.) In fact, many people learn to "play the game"
effectively, to do what is wanted of them, and to confidently reap the re-
wards handed out for compliance. This counts as success and generates
the feeling he described. It is not autonomy. Playing someone else's game
well is not defining the path of one's own life.
These perverse messages about autonomy contain a germ of truth:
powerlessness is destructive of autonomy. And the question of power
points to the ways autonomy entails, but does not consist in, a feeling.
Autonomy is a capacity, but it is unimaginable in the absence of the feel-
ing or experience of being autonomous. The capacity can be destroyed by
being subjected to the arbitrary and damaging power of others.4" Power
relations are, in that sense, an external, "objective" reality. To be autono-
37. I think the qualification was also, less consciously, a response to the sense that taking subjec-
tivity seriously was unacceptable in academic theorizing about law and politics. And, indeed, despite
the disclaimer, a commentator on the paper wittily objected that, "If autonomy is a feeling, there are
pharmacological solutions to the problem." I think that is clever, but wrong. Perhaps I have too little
faith in modern technology and/or too little experience with drugs, but I can imagine a drug making
one feel euphoric, maybe even happy, but not autonomous.
38. Of course, to ascertain someone's feeling of autonomy, it would be necessary to communicate
effectively about the content of the value and the experience, not simply ask for a response to a term,
"autonomy."
39. The distinction between power over others and empowerment, a power from within, is dis-
cussed in Starhawk, TRUTH OR DARE: ENCOUNTERS WITH POWER, AUTHORITY, AND MYSTERY
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).
40. Bettelheim's THE INFORMED HEART, supra note 33, is a study of the extreme case of such
destruction in concentration camps.
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mous a person must feel a sense of her own power (which does not mean
power over others), and that feeling is only possible within a structure of
relationships conducive to autonomy. But it is also the case that if we lose
our feeling of being autonomous, we lose our capacity to be so. Autonomy
is a capacity that exists only in the context of social relations that support
it and only in conjunction with the internal sense of being autonomous.
Although I define autonomy as a capacity and not a feeling, I insist
upon the feeling of autonomy as an inseparable component of the capacity
for several reasons. First, I think the capacity does not exist without the
feeling. Second, I think the feeling is our best guide to understanding the
structure of those relationships which make autonomy possible. Third, fo-
cusing on the feelings of autonomy defines as authoritative the voices of
those whose autonomy is at issue. Their autonomy is then not a question
that can be settled for them by others. The focus on feeling or internal
experience defines whose perspective is taken seriously,"' and by turning
our attention in the right direction it enhances our ability to learn what
fosters and constitutes autonomy. For the purpose of evaluating institu-
tions, one can generate a list, or at least a sense, of the components or
dimensions of autonomy and then try to identify the practices that seem to
foster some or all of those components. To that extent one would be en-
gaged in an "objective" inquiry. But the underlying concern would be the
actual experience of autonomy. We cannot understand or protect, much
less reconceive, autonomy unless we attend to what gives citizens a sense
of autonomy, to what makes them feel competent, effective, able to exer-
cise some control over their lives, as opposed to feeling passive, helpless,
and dependent."8
But this ingredient of subjectivity introduces an added complication.
The institutions, social practices, and relations that foster the feeling of
autonomy may vary considerably across cultures and over time within a
culture."8 These variations raise the question of whether one form and
experience of autonomy (and the institutions that sustain it) can be judged
to be superior to another. (Such a judgment is, of course, implicit in this
article.) Recognizing subjective experience as an essential component of
41. I owe this insight to Lucinda Finley.
42. A government's efforts to encourage its subjects to feel autonomous when they are not is
obviously a perversion. The recent history of administrative hearings may provide evidence of the
relation between the actual effectiveness of citizen-participation and the way hearings make partici-
pants feel about the process, the decision, and their role in it. See Handler, Justice for the Welfare
Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-The Wisconsin Experience, 43 Soc. SERV. REV. 12 (1969);
Hammer and Hartley, Procedural Due Process and the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study of
AFDC Fair Hearings in Wisconsin, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 145.
43. For example, the much vaunted freedom of mainstream North-American life seems to many
Native Americans to entail patterns of work with such extreme regimentation as to be incompatible
with freedom or autonomy. (Brian Slattery of Osgoode Hall Law School provided me with this exam-
ple from his work with Native peoples.) Of course, this observation leaves open the question whether
the participants in the mainstream patterns of life actually experience their lives as autonomous.
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autonomy invites all the much debated problems of objectivity and univer-
sal truths-which are beyond the scope of this article. Here I want only to
draw attention to feelings as a basic dimension of the abstract concept of
autonomy, and to note that feminist theory is becoming increasingly prac-
ticed in dealing with these issues.
Recognizing the subjective element of autonomy is also important be-
cause the very fact that autonomy is in part a feeling may make people
particularly resistant to changes in its form. Bruno Bettelheim, for exam-
ple, suggests that the. ancient nomads, as they watched society shifting to
agriculture, may have responded with anxiety and contempt as they saw
their fellows give up "for greater economic ease and security, a relative
freedom to roam.""" In this instance, Bettelheim is willing to make a tacit
judgment that the new settled life was not, in fact, a diminished one. But
he does suggest that real accommodations had to be made. Because, as I
argued above, trade-offs are probably inevitable, hostility to new ap-
proaches to autonomy may be based on real perceptions of loss. Perhaps it
is even likely that the new approach will draw the contempt Bettelheim
mentions. Perhaps all alternatives to what has been perceived as the es-
sence of freedom are likely to be cast by anxious critics in terms of the
basic (and base) needs, as libertarians, for example, dismiss as mere envy
or greed claims that economic equality is a precondition of autonomy.
Acknowledging the complexities of understanding, comparing, and eval-
uating feelings of autonomy, it is still useful to look to actual practices
that seem to have fostered this feeling, or at least have been associated
with the concept. Past practices, however deficient, may provide important
clues to new sources of autonomy and to the problems they are likely to
entail. And present practices offer concrete examples of the efforts to rec-
oncile autonomy with collective control. Let us turn therefore to what the
present has to offer us.
IV. THE INSIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Potential of Due Process
My objective in this section is to point to those aspects of contemporary
administrative law which suggest the kinds of values and practices needed
to make autonomy more viable in a bureaucratic state.45 I shall start with
44. Bettelheim, supra note 33, at 45.
45. I do not mean to suggest anywhere in this article that a bureaucratic state is inevitable. And it
seems quite possible that, ultimately, bureaucracy is incompatible with autonomy. Kathy Ferguson
certainly thinks so. She has argued very persuasively that whenever people are being "managed" by
others, something is wrong. The main point of her book (THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAU-
CRACY [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984]) is the claim that there are viable and vastly
preferable alternatives to bureaucracy. But as I noted at the outset, the hope is to find in our present
practices clues to better solutions to the general problem that arises when there is both collective
control and the mediate application of collective decisions. Only a very small community could avoid
the latter. I remain agnostic on the question of whether that is what we should aspire to. And without
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the positive contributions of contemporary American law and then identify
some of its problems-problems that reflect the errors our tradition invites
and the difficulty of avoiding them.
Administrative law mediates between governmental agencies and the
citizens subject to their decisions. It defines the rights and obligations of
both parties, and it has in recent years shown impressive-if
flawed-attention to the problem of making dependence upon governmen-
tal benefits compatible with autonomy. The chief contributions of the law
are to be found in the "due process explosion" (followed by retrenchment)
signalled by Goldberg v. Kelly."' In that now famous case, the Supreme
Court adopted the idea that welfare payments were the kind of benefit-a
form of "new property" 47-which could not be taken away without due
process. Specifically, the Court held that a welfare recipient was entitled
to a hearing before benefits were terminated.
The Court stressed the fact that welfare recipients were dependent on
government for their basic necessities and that this made the provision of a
pre-termination hearing particularly important. This case seems to be an
instance of an effort to provide some degree of control and effectiveness to
those in the most dependent relation to the government. The opportunity
to be heard by those deciding one's fate, to participate in the decision at
least to the point of telling one's side of the story, presumably means not
only that the administrators will have a better basis for determining what
the law provides in a given case, but that the recipients will experience
their relations to the agency in a different way. The right to a hearing
declares their views to be significant, their contribution to be relevant. In
principle, a hearing designates recipients as part of the process of collec-
tive decision-making rather than as passive, external objects of judgment.
Inclusion in the process offers the potential for providing subjects of bu-
reaucratic power with some effective control as well as a sense of dignity,
competence, and power. A hearing could of course be a sham, or be per-
ceived to be so even if it were not. But the possibility of failure or perver-
sion of the process leaves its potential contribution to autonomy
unchanged.
This case and the (shifting) trend it started is of interest because it
suggests something important about the possibility of achieving autonomy
within a context of dependence. Dependence is a reality, and will be a
reality in any system based on collective responsibility for the material
well-being of some or all of its citizens. The problem is to avoid making
autonomy a casualty of such collective responsibility. Goldberg v. Kelly
suggests that there are forms of participation in administrative decisions
waiting to figure that one out, I think we can make progress on the question of autonomy.
46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
47. The phrase and the idea come from Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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which may prevent citizens from becoming passive subjects. The relation-
ship can be shaped by the nature of the decision-making and the citizen's
role in it. The nature of the citizen's relation to the agency to which he or
she is subject need not be dictated by the substance of the agency's power,
e.g., to grant or withhold basic necessities. This enormous power and cor-
responding dependency will affect, but need not destroy, the citizen's
autonomy.
Most of the contributions of contemporary administrative law are of
this order: provisions for participation in one form or another. (The ex-
pansion of standing-the rules defining who may challenge agency deci-
sions in court-is a related development. 8 ) My purpose here is not to
analyze the line of cases through which the rights to hearings have been
elaborated and restricted, but rather is to suggest that the cases reveal
something important about the possibility of autonomy in the modern
state and the requirements for it. The components of autonomy to which
these legal developments seem responsive are dignity, efficacy, competence,
and comprehension, as well as defense against arbitrariness. However
mixed the cases, they provide some hope that there are ways of structuring
bureaucratic decision-making so that the relations between citizen and
state foster rather than undermine these values.
B. The Limits of Due Process
Of course, legal rules alone will not determine whether bureaucratic
encounters actually promote autonomy. Joel Handler offers an account of
the failures of a federal law (Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, P.L. 94-142) which seems designed to ensure optimal conditions for
interaction between parents of handicapped children and the officials who
will determine the children's placement.' 9 The law has all the ingredients
one might want: its requires ongoing participation by the parents in the
decision-making, flexibility, individual tailoring of programs, hearings,
and full rights of appeal. But stipulating these requirements does not
make them a reality. In particular, it does not mean that parents actually
take an active part, that they are listened to, or that they feel as though
they are actors in the decision-making rather than (indirect) subjects of
it.50 The schools have strong incentives of time and money not to have the
48. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); compare United States v. Students Chal-
lenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
49. In terms of substantive outcomes, the provision of education for handicapped children, Han-
dler considers the law largely a success. It is specifically with regard to the relationship between the
clients and the official decision-makers that there is a striking disparity between the admirable inten-
tions and language of the law and its actual effects. Joel F. Handler, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRE-
TION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY, Ch. 5 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986).
50. There is, of course, an unusual quality to these decisions since their actual subject, the child,
is often not a participant (although the Madison plan calls for them to be when appropriate). The
more general problem of structuring autonomous dependence, when the subject of the decision must
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parents actively involved, and they have been successful in complying with
the formal requirements of the law while undermining its purposes.
Handler's message is not, however, that bureaucratic encounters cannot
be structured so that clients are genuinely autonomous actors; it is merely
that formal law alone cannot achieve this end. Indeed, he provides a de-
tailed example5" of the schools in Madison, Wisconsin, which seem to
have achieved genuine participation, and to have done so with similar
(only this time actually realized) means: participation, information, and
flexibility, as well as formal rights of appeal. Among the many factors
that account for the difference, the most important seems to be that the
relevant personnel in the Madison schools actually wanted parental par-
ticipation; they thought it was necessary for the special education pro-
grams to work effectively. Given this goal, they were able to design the
process of decision-making to encourage participation and to make it
meaningful. For example, parents participated in the earliest stages of as-
sessing the child's needs and planning a program, rather than being called
in merely to consent to a diagnosis and plan already formulated (as was
generally the case in the other systems). The teachers saw the parents'
information and judgment about the child as valuable and thus treated
them as actual partners in the decision-making. By contrast, in other sys-
tems studied, parents who raised questions were treated as "trouble mak-
ers. ' " Handler thinks that it is particularly important that in Madison
conflict between the parents and the schools was not deflected, suppressed
or avoided, but treated as part of a constructive process through which a
better decision could be reached. The Madison schools also recognized
that even with their positive attitude toward the parents and their accept-
ance of conflict, there was a power imbalance of resources and informa-
tion that had to be addressed if the parents were to be able to take part
effectively. "Parent advocates" were made available to try to redress the
imbalance. In Massachusetts, by contrast, in the meetings at which the
parents were presented with plans (made in their absence), the parents
"were outnumbered, they were strangers confronting a group of people
who had struck a bargain between them, and the discussion was often in
technical jargon with the subtle implication that the child or the parent or
both were at fault."5 In Madison, information in clear, ordinary lan-
guage was provided. The decision-making process was ongoing and open-
ended, with room for readjustment. In most other school districts what
also be able to participate in the decision, is thus not the problem Handler addresses. There is some
question whether he adequately considers the children's autonomy in his analysis. See Minow, Part
of the Solution, Part of the Problem (Book Review), 34 UCLA L. REV. 981 (1987).
51. Handler, supra note 49, Ch. 4. Handler notes that his is a case study based on interviews
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was supposed to be an ongoing process of consultation was usually col-
lapsed into one or two meetings.
In short, "the conclusion of virtually all the research is that whereas
P.L. 94-142 seems to have resulted in more parental contact with the
school authorities, there has not been much change in parental involve-
ment in the actual decision-making process."" Throughout the Madison
approach, there is a recognition that the parents are in a continuing rela-
tionship with the school. The objective is not simply to arrive at a decision
to which the parents will not object, but to sustain a relationship such that
the necessary ongoing decisions can be collectively made in the best inter-
ests of the child (which in turn are recognized to involve relations with the
parents and with the school and relations between the school and the
parents).
The parents' own testimony is the most compelling evidence that the
system in Madison was "working," that the parents were not subordi-
nated objects of bureaucratic decision-making, but were partners in a rela-
tionship that fostered their dignity, efficacy, comprehension, and compe-
tence and that protected them from arbitrary power. The parents were
dependent on the schools (although not as starkly as a welfare recipient is
dependent on the welfare bureaucracy), but their relationship was never-
theless characterized by autonomy. The dependence was not removed, it
was transformed. The autonomy was thus, of course, not based on inde-
pendence, on the capacity to make decisions without being subject to any-
one else's preferences, judgments, or choices (the sort of autonomy Reich
associates with property"). It was autonomy within relationship. And for
some parents, the autonomy fostered in the relationship with the school
seems to have made them feel more generally competent and secure in
their ability to understand and help make decisions about their child.56
There are also cautionary dimensions to the Madison story. First, Han-
dler notes that Madison has a long history of active citizen participation
which may have made possible both the inception and the success of this
experiment. But while that means that one should not be overly sanguine
about simply transporting the model elsewhere, it also suggests that pat-
terns of social and political interaction can foster autonomous relation-
ships. It further invites us to inquire into the details of the institutional
and social practices that have fostered this participatory culture.
A little more troubling is the suggestion that participation actually
dropped off once parents developed a high level of trust in the school. A
successful relationship seemed to make parents feel that they need not
work to sustain it. This is, of course, easily understandable. With all the
54. Ibid., 68.
55. Reich, supra note 47.
56. Handler, supra note 49, at 79.
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competing pressures on one's time, why not delegate time-consuming deci-
sion-making to those one trusts? (And of course genuine participation is
very time-consuming. Handler suggests that is one of the reasons most
school districts comply with the legal requirements for parental participa-
tion in a perfunctory way.) In Madison, it was the school officials who
complained about the parents' lack of participation.
Of course it is an old problem that genuine power-sharing and democ-
racy are time-consuming. One would need to know more about the
Madison story to tell whether the parents' stepping back from active in-
volvement necessarily undermined the autonomy fostered by the original
relationship. It may be that the Madison parents were exercising their
autonomy to make a reasonable choice of delegation-a choice that has
nothing in common with forced acquiescence in the presumed superior
authority of school officials. Perhaps it is enough if the parents continue to
feel able to understand and evaluate what is happening with their child,
and able to become involved whenever it seems necessary to them. Their
sense of a capacity to participate may be what is crucial, rather than par-
ticipation itself. Unfortunately, it may also be that while the parents' au-
tonomy remains intact, the child's education suffers when participation
drops off.
There are other problems (e.g., the question of whether the "parent
advocates" are actually used and what their role should be) and quibbles
(Handler's language of negotiation and bargaining does not capture my
image of an optimal relationship, and even the parental statements he
likes best have hints that the primary decision-makers are the school pro-
fessionals)."7 But overall, Handler's argument shows both that the par-
ticipatory move in American law can foster autonomy and that legal re-
quirements alone are insufficient.
C. Conceptual Failures of Liberal Rights58
These developments in administrative law grew out of the best in the
American liberal tradition: its emphasis on the protection of individuals
from the power of the state. But the tradition has also been the source of
problems with the judicial response to conflicts between individuals and
the bureaucracies upon which they are dependent. It is hardly surprising
that a tradition which has conceived of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the collective primarily in terms of the threat of the latter does
not provide an adequate basis for defining individual rights in the context
57. The quote he uses to open the chapter on Madison reads: "Our family has never been criti-
cized, they've never said, 'you're failing him.' They've encouraged us to allow him to do more and try
more, and not to be afraid. They've convinced us he can do more than we think he can do." Ibid. One
can see that the relationship has been helpful, supportive, and respectful, but to me it does not quite
convey the sense of fully equal partnership.
58. Handler also treats the failures of due process as a conceptual failure.
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of affirmative responsibilities of the state. The dichotomy between individ-
ual rights and state power has meant that the courts have particular
trouble in cases which require them both to accept the state's intrusion
into previously private spheres and to develop a useful framework of indi-
vidual rights.
Wyman v. James59 dramatically illustrates the justices' inability to ana-
lyze rights in the context of dependence. The Supreme Court held that a
social worker did not need a warrant for a "home visit" to a woman re-
ceiving Aid for Families with Dependent Children. Justice Blackmun's
underlying argument for the majority was essentially this: in accepting the
state's offer of responsibility for the welfare of her child, Mrs. James had
declared her home life to be the state's business. She could not then turn
around and stand on the traditional rights of individuals against state in-
trusion. In dissent, Justice Douglas made an impassioned argument
against the state's capacity to "buy up" rights when it distributes largesse
and convincingly argued that if Mrs. James were a businessman objecting
to administrative searches, she would win. But Douglas showed virtually
no acknowledgement of the ways in which traditional rights may have to
be reconceived as the state takes on responsibilities that transform its rela-
tions to the individual. Neither approach seems to recognize that the task
is to think creatively about the protections of autonomy given the realities
of overlapping spheres of public and private interest. Neither a denial of
rights nor a denial of realities can solve the problem.
Even when courts do try to protect individual rights in the face of col-
lective power, they tend to use a private-rights model to define and justify
the rights in question. Thus Goldberg v. Kelly uses the concept of "new
property" to explain why welfare recipients are entitled to pre-
termination hearings. The choice of property is understandable, but par-
ticularly unfortunate. As subsequent developments 0 have shown, charac-
terizing dependents' rights as property invites a focus on entitlement that
misses the point and facilitates retrenchment. Property also carries with it
a powerful tradition of, inequality which should not be incorporated into
new conceptions of autonomy.
But the problem with the concept of new property is more general. It is
a mistake to tie protections for citizens' autonomy to particular substantive
rights. The objective is to protect the autonomy of citizens in their interac-
tions with government. The appropriate forms of those interactions may
vary depending on the kind of interest involved. But the entitlement to
autonomy, and to bureaucratic encounters conducive to autonomy, should
59. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
60. These developments began with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which the
Court held that a one-year position at a state university did not constitute a property interest and did
not, therefore, bring with it an entitlement to due process.
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not depend upon or be deduced from the particular interest at stake. 1
What is at issue here is autonomy and democratic citizenship, which are
not relevant only to particular rights.
And for reasons suggested in my discussion of Wyman v. James, the use
of a private-rights model may only lead to the abandonment of any judi-
cial protection. Jerry Mashaw's similar argument about private law and
public law models suggests that the evident inappropriateness of private
law models for state undertakings such as welfare may lead courts to cede
complete authority to legislatures to define the terms on which benefits are
granted or withdrawn.6
V. DEMOCRACY AND AUTONOMY
The possibility of such abandonment points to another, quite different
error or danger of contemporary administrative law: the tendency to treat
autonomy exclusively as a matter of process rather than as a substantive
value. The danger arises because so many of the protections for autonomy
rest on forms of participation. These forms are indeed the strength of the
legal response, but the focus on process may easily be confused with a
powerful trend in contemporary legal theory: the effort to build a consti-
tutional theory based on the values of democracy and consent alone.
This seems to me a fundamental error-a misunderstanding not only of
our constitutional system, but of the kind of political system which can
foster the good society, and autonomy in particular. Property was once the
core of a tension between democratic values of popular rule and liberal
values of individual rights as limits on state power. Property neither can
nor should continue to serve this role. But we should not abandon the
tension itself. It has been the strength of our system and captures the
irreducible tension between the individual and the collective which any
good society must recognize and find ways of dealing with. Autonomy
should be contrasted with democratic values in the following related
senses: democracy is not itself sufficient to ensure autonomy; autonomy is
a substantive value which can be threatened by democratic outcomes, even
though the democratic process is itself a necessary component of auton-
omy; and the outcomes of democratic processes should respect the auton-
omy of all citizens and should be held accountable for doing so.
The confusion and correspondence between democracy and autonomy
do not, of course, rest with prevailing legal theories alone; the correspon-
dence between the two is real. Participation seems central to both. Its im-
portance to democracy is obvious. It has been my basic point here that
61. In constitutional terms, which I have so far avoided, one might argue that there is a "liberty
interest" in autonomy itself, rather than that individuals are entitled to be treated in a manner com-
patible with autonomy only when they can demonstrate a property or liberty interest.
62. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129 (1983).
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citizens who participate directly6" in the decisions affecting them are less
likely to relinquish their autonomy as they accept the benefits or control
of the state. But participation here is a means to autonomy, not its sub-
stantive content. The fact that the means of protecting autonomy may pri-
marily be forms of participation should not lead to the confusion that au-
tonomy can be subsumed under democracy. We should not collapse
democracy and autonomy into a single value, despite their close
connection.
The perfection of democracy thus cannot alone assure protection of au-
tonomy. To believe that it can is to believe that a democratically organized
collective would never do violence to the autonomy of any of its members.
That seems to me implausible. What is required is an understanding of
the substance of autonomy and of the practices that foster it so that citi-
zens can ask whether the actions or institutions proposed in their collective
decision-making are consistent with the autonomy of all. We must, for
example, ask whether official action in any particular circumstance denies
clients basic respect or treats them in ways that makes them less able to
understand what is happening to them, less able to participate effectively
in the decisions affecting their lives, less able to define and pursue their
own goals-in short, in ways that undermine rather than foster their ca-
pacity to find and live by their own law.
It may be that if such failings are found, increased participation will be
a partial remedy. Or the client may need information or support. Or the
outlook of the official (e.g., seeing parents as time-consuming sources of
trouble rather than as participants valued for their information and judg-
ment) may be the source of the problem. Or it may be that the interaction,
such as intrusive home visits, is inherently incompatible with the auton-
omy of the client and can only be justified under exceptional circum-
stances (e.g., the sort of probable cause needed for a warrant). And im-
passes such as that over home visits may be evidence that the whole
relationship between client and authority must be restructured if it is to
foster the client's autonomy.
Further, some mechanism would probably be needed to encourage and
facilitate the posing of questions about institutional compatibility with au-
tonomy. In other words, there must be means of measuring the content of
collective decisions against the (separate and substantive) value of auton-
omy. Such means would include appropriate institutions, language, and
habits of inquiry through which citizens and representatives of some kind
(including judges) could check whether the laws, rules, or patterns of offi-
cial behavior fostered or undermined autonomy. Such an inquiry is only
63. As noted earlier, I do not think that the more general form of participation in elections of
democratic bodies can substitute for direct participation in administrative decision-making.
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possible if we have a concept of autonomy that is distinct from the demo-
cratic processes which may threaten it.
It is important to distinguish the above (somewhat vague and awk-
wardly stated) ideas from the conventional liberal understanding of indi-
vidual rights, and of autonomy in particular. First, the wordy awkward-
ness arises from a deliberate effort to avoid the neat and pithy claim that
autonomy should be a substantive limit to democratic outcomes. That
powerful vision of rights-as-limits no longer seems to me the best way of
thinking about or trying to institutionalize the notion that in any society
there will be competing values and that groups of people exercising demo-
cratic power may be inclined to override even basic values. What seems
important is the clear articulation of the values a society considers basic
(surely an ongoing process), together with the idea that democratic out-
comes are not (at least in the first instance) dispositive of the meaning of
those values or what counts as a violation of them. But that is a long way
from saying that rights are trumps. A society should, as I argued above,
acknowledge the inherent tension between the collective and the individual
and find means of mediating as well as sustaining the tension. I say "sus-
taining" because the values of neither the individual nor the collective
should be collapsed into the other. Treating rights as limits on democracy
is one way of maintaining both distinct values; but it is a method that
throws its weight too heavily to the side of the individual.64
There is a second distinction that is best put as an answer to the follow-
ing challenge: You started by saying that you were going to break down
the conventional dichotomies, but aren't we right back in the conventional
choices and conflicts between collective goods and individual rights?
Aren't you just restating the old liberal argument that, of course, rights
(including autonomy) sometimes have to be balanced against the public
good-only without the willingness to guarantee rights against collective
oppression? How is this a new conception of autonomy?68 The answer is
that in measuring and weighing collective choices against the value of au-
tonomy, the meaning of autonomy will be different. The autonomy I am
talking about does remain an individual value, a value that takes its
meaning from the recognition of (and respect for) the inherent individual-
ity of each person. But it takes its meaning no less from the recognition
that individuality cannot be conceived of in isolation from the social con-
64. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms designates rights as basic values, but it does
not treat them as absolute limits. The very first section of the Charter says that it "guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
§ 1. There is also an "override" provision that permits legislatures to pass a law notwithstanding its
violation of the Charter. Id. at § 33(1). The "notwithstanding" clause must be part of the bill and any
law so passed ceases to have effect after five years (and thus would have to be passed again). Id. at §
33(3). Canada is likely, therefore, to generate a jurisprudence and a set of institutional practices that
put into effect some version of the notion of rights that I have articulated.
65. My thanks to my colleague Alan Brudner for posing this challenge.
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text in which that individuality comes into being. The value of autonomy
will at some level be inseparable from the relations that make it possible;
there will thus be a social component built into the meaning of autonomy.
That is the difference. But the presence of a social component does not
mean that the value cannot be threatened by collective choices; hence the
continuing need to identify autonomy as a separate value, to take account
of its vulnerability to democratic decision-making, and to find some way
of making those decisions "accountable" to the value of autonomy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This inquiry has been prompted more by an interest in future possibili-
ties than by hopes for the perfection of autonomy under the current Amer-
ican legal system. Forms of bureaucratic decision-making-however par-
ticipatory or otherwise optimal-cannot change basic power relations and
structures of inequality. These more than anything determine the poten-
tial for autonomy for all citizens, for subordination and powerlessness are
incompatible with autonomy. But even in a quite imperfect society, exper-
iments with forms of collective (bureaucratic) power and with the rela-
tions between those implementing it and those dependent upon it can give
us insight into what optimal forms and relations would look like. What I
have tried to do is suggest a framework which we can use to help extract
what is useful out of current experiments-since I believe that a new con-
ception of autonomy is not likely to spring full-blown from theory.
I see the development of such a conception as essential for working out
alternatives to our present system. The alternatives which seem compel-
ling to me all involve a far greater role for collective power and responsi-
bility than does our current system. Those who aspire to such alternatives
must be able to persuade themselves as well as their critics that such
changes need not diminish, though they will certainly change, autonomy.
More importantly, we must have language that adequately captures our
highest goals, in terms that reflect both the individual and the social
dimensions of human beings. That language will take some time to
emerge, but in the meantime we cannot cede to liberal convention a mo-
nopoly on the value of autonomy.
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